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SURFACE FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION 
IN MEXICO POST NAFTA
Richard L. Clarke 
Clemson University
One of the significant expressed objectives of NAFTA was the improvement of cross-border 
transportation to enable a more efficient and cost effective flow of goods among Mexico, 
Canada and the United States. This article examines the changes that have taken place 
in surface freight transportation between Mexico and the U.S. since NAFTA was signed in
1993.
INTRODUCTION
One of the major expressed objectives of the 1993 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
was to facilitate the cross-border movement of 
goods and services between the territories of 
Canada, Mexico and the United States. Another 
objective was to increase trade among the three 
countries by removing tariffs, quotas and other 
trade restrictions. A review of the increases in 
trade volume since 1993 provides ample evidence 
that the later objective has been achieved. For 
example, the number of commercial trucks 
carrying U.S. exports to Mexico increased over 
407% from 1990 to 2000 while the number of 
trucks transporting Mexican exports to the U.S. 
increased 328% over the same period. There 
were a reported 2.26 million commercial truck 
crossings into Mexico from Texas in 2000 and 
another 2.38 million truck crossings from Mexico 
into Texas (TAMIU, 2002). In the same report, 
the Texas Center for Border Economic and 
Enterprise Development, reported the number of 
freight railcars transporting goods into Mexico 
more than doubled from 1993 to 2000 from 
147,216 to 298,919 (TAMIU, 2002). However, in 
the ten years since NAFTA’s passage there has
been little improvement in the cross-border 
movement of goods between Mexico and the 
United States.
Commercial truck movements into each 
country’s interior remain a time-consuming, 
inconvenient process, largely unchanged since 
1990. Neither country yet allows foreign 
trucking beyond a twenty-mile commercial zone. 
As a result, the promised benefits of improved 
transportation, such as faster transit times, 
reduced pipeline inventories and better 
reliability of shipment delivery, have not yet 
been realized. While cross border movement of 
goods remains as cumbersome, inefficient and 
unpredictable as it was prior to NAFTA, there 
have been several significant improvements in 
Mexico’s transportation infrastructure since 
NAFTA’s passage. The purpose of this article is 
two fold: to examine the progress Mexico has 
made in modernizing its rail and highway 
transportation modes and to outline the reasons 
why there has not been much improvement in 
the cross-border flow of goods between the U.S. 
and Mexico. This article also reviews major 
economic policy changes in Mexico and makes 
recommendations on how Mexico and the United
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States might achieve a better flow of goods 
across their shared border.
RAIL IMPROVEMENTS IN MEXICO 
Privatization
Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Mexico (FNM), 
Mexico’s national railroad, was established in 
1873. It was owned and operated by the central 
government of Mexico from 1937-1994. Over the 
course of this 57-year period, Mexico’s rail 
system suffered from neglect and severe lack of 
capital funding (Barrera, 1999). As a result, 
Mexico’s national railroad became slow, 
unreliable and highly inefficient. The lack of 
required track replacement and track 
maintenance caused frequent derailments. By 
1980, 75 per cent of Mexico’s existing track dated 
back to pre-revolution days before 1910 (Barrera, 
1999). Train robberies by organized gangs of 
armed bandits were also commonplace during 
this period. Approximately one in every five 
trains was boarded and robbed as recently as the 
late 1980’s (Kaufman, 2001).
Beginning in 1994, the Mexican government 
began to address the need for significant 
improvement in its freight rail system by 
deciding to privatize the entire 16,500-mile 
network. In the same year, the first of FNM’s 
three major railway regions was sold to the 
Transportation Ferroviaria Mexicana (TFM) 
consortium for $1.4 billion. TFM’s winning bid 
gave TFM partners the right to operate the 
2,661-mile Northeast system for 50 years with 
an option for an additional 50 years (Vantuono, 
1999). TFM’s line is the most important of the 
major FNM (Ferrocarril del Noreste) rail regions 
because it provides the primary rail route in 
Northern Mexico and links the industrial areas 
of Mexico City and Monterey with the United 
States at Laredo, Texas. Approximately 60% of 
all the trade between Mexico and the United 
States crosses the border at Laredo/Nuevo 
Laredo (TAMIU, 2002). Although the Northeast 
system controls less than 19% of the total 
Mexican trackage it moves 40% of Mexico’s 
domestic freight (Vantuono, 1999). For the past
four years the three TFM partners have been the 
U.S.-based Kansas City Southern Industries 
Corporation (37%), its Mexican affiliate, 
TMM/Grupo Service (38.5%) and the Mexican 
government (24.5%). By law, Mexico’s four 
privatized rail systems must be at least 51% 
owned by Mexican-based investors, which has 
required U.S. investors to find Mexican partners. 
The privatization of all four parts of the FNM 
was completed last year under this ownership 
rule.
The second rail freight system to become 
privatized was the Ferrocarril line, a 4,052-mile 
Pacific-North line and the 938 mile Ojenaga- 
Topolobampo railroad. The new owner is Grupo 
Ferroviacio Mexicano Mexican Railways, a newly 
formed alliance of two large Mexican companies 
and the U.S.-based Union Pacific Corporation. 
The Ferrocarril line connects Calexico, California 
and El Paso, Eagle Pass and Brownsville, Texas 
(House, 1999).
A third section, the 1,000-mile Southeast section, 
is now owned by a group of Mexican investors. 
The Southeast Railroad connects Mexico City 
with several important ports along the Gulf 
coast including Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos. 
This line has the lowest revenues currently but 
the highest growth potential because it links 
several of Mexico’s busiest seaports. Railcars are 
currently being ferried between Coatzacoalcos 
and Mobile, Alabama by Gulflink Marine. There 
is also reported interest in the Southeast line by 
the Canadian National (CN) Railroad. With its 
recent acquisition of the Illinois Central 
Railroad, CN currently provides cross-border 
service between Canada and the U.S. and has 
routes to the Mexican border (Kaufman, 2001).
Improvements Since 1994
With privatization has come a much needed 
infusion of capital to replace obsolete rolling 
stock, buy new locomotives, repair and upgrade 
track and install computerized control systems. 
Most of the improvements have been to the 
Northeast section owned by TFM and 
underwritten with capital provided by Kansas
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City Southern Industries. TFM spent $90 
million for infrastructure improvements within 
a year of winning the operating bid and another 
$600 million by the end of 2001 (KCSI, 2002). 
The money has gone to purchase over 2,800 new 
pieces of rolling stock, and 150 new locomotives. 
TFM has also negotiated a new labor agreement, 
rebuilt the main line between Mexico City and 
Laredo, built a new service center and a new 
computerized railroad operation center (KCSI, 
2002). The investment appears to be paying off, 
at least as of year ending in December 1999 
versus the previous year. The 1999 revenue 
from railroad operations was $524.5 million, an 
increase of 22 percent over 1998 while the 
operation ratio improved from 85.5% to 76.6% 
(KCSI, 2002).
Mexican Railways has also invested heavily in 
infrastructure movements to improve their 
4,052-mile rail network. By the end of 1999, 
they had spent nearly $400 million to rebuild 
track, build new sidings and modernize their 
fleet of railcars (Kaufman, 2001). Both new 
major system owners have also beefed up 
security. Mexican railways has hired 1600 
security officers, put up new fences and lighting 
and covered all railcar hatch covers with 
fiberglass. TFM has hired over 1000 security 
personnel, reducing the number of train 
robberies (House, 1999). As a result, train theft 
no longer appears to be a major problem as it 
was before rail privatization.
The benefits of privatization are beginning to be 
realized by shippers. Vantuono (1999) reports 
that Mexican Railways shipped 30 percent more 
grain and other agricultural commodities in 1999 
than it did in 1998. The Northeast rail line 
experienced similar growth from 1998 to 1999 
and reduced its average transit time from Laredo 
to Mexico City from 60 hours to 36 hours. As a 
result of capital improvements and better track 
maintenance, the newly privatized Northeast 
rail line can offer shippers transit times equal to 
motor carriage at lower rates. Rail privatization 
has also helped cross-border transportation.
Products moving by train from the U.S. to 
Mexico’s interior can now be moved on a single 
through bill of lading. Formerly, rail shipments 
from the U.S. into Mexico had to be rebilled at 
the border, which was often a very time- 
consuming process. Railcars must still be 
switched to Mexican locomotives at the border 
but since the operations are now frequently 
under the control of the same company, the 
switching is much more efficient than it was 
before rail privatization (House, 1999).
Remaining Problems in 
Cross Border Rail Freight
Incompatibilities in the customs clearance 
procedures between the United States and 
Mexico remain, even though the new railroads 
have built customs processing yards to facilitate 
clearance. Both the TFM Railroad and Mexican 
Railways have built processing yards several 
miles from the main border crossing at Nuevo 
Laredo, but the railroads are only capable of 
improving processes under their control. The 
governments of the United States and Mexico 
have done little to reduce the paperwork and 
bureaucracy inherent in the customs clearing 
process (Ross, 2001). One improvement would be 
to make the shipper of record the company with 
whom customs officials deal, not the railroad or 
the freight-forwarder. There is often not enough 
shipper involvement in the clearance process to 
clearly identify who the shipper is and what is 
being shipped. This issue has become a matter 
of national security since 9/11.
Another problem facing the Mexican railroad 
industry is a shortage of intermodal facilities 
throughout the country. According to McCosh 
(2001), intermodal service has improved since 
rail privatization, but is still slow and inefficient. 
Mexican Railways and the Northeast Railroad 
are planning new intermodal facilities in Mexico 
City and Guadalajara, among other places. The 
Pantaco terminal in Mexico City is incapable of 
handling much more traffic, but the new facility 
is expected to triple the current lift capacity in
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Mexico City. Intermodal movements using rail 
for long hauls are expected to grow over the next 
few years.
MEXICAN TRUCKING
The Mexican trucking industry currently 
accounts for approximately ninety percent of all 
goods transported within Mexico (Ross, 2001). 
Cross-border trucking by Mexican carriers, 
however, continues to be restricted to a twenty- 
mile commercial zone along the American- 
Mexican border. This restriction contradicts the 
North American Free Trade Agreement which 
stipulated that Mexican trucks would be allowed 
free access throughout the border states of 
California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas by 
1995. The North American Free Trade treaty 
also stipulated that by January 1, 1999, trucks 
from either country would be allowed cross- 
border access to any point in the other country. 
By 2000, foreign investment in trucking 
companies would be allowed up to Fifty-one 
percent of the company and by 2003, 100-percent 
ownership would be allowed. To date, neither 
country is in compliance with these provisions. 
The United States government has not given 
Mexican trucks access to the United States 
because of safety and labor concerns. Opposition 
in the U.S. has been led by organized labor and 
highway safety lobby groups. The Mexican 
government has reciprocated by not allowing 
American trucks access to Mexico.
U.S. Opposition to Open Borders
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
U.S. consumer groups, and U.S. insurance 
underwriters have combined to create a powerful 
political coalition that opposes opening the 
border to Mexican trucks. The teamsters 
opposed the idea of NAFTA from its inception 
based on the belief that American union 
members would lose their jobs to less expensive 
Mexican truckers. James Hoffa, the president of 
the Teamsters Union, has been a strong and 
outspoken opponent of opening the border to 
Mexican trucks predicting that it would cost 
several thousand union jobs (Hall, 1999).
Consumer groups, including Citizens for Reliable 
and Safe Highways (CRASH), have cited 
Department of Transportation (DOT) statistics 
that show commercial trucks account for a 
significant and disproportionate number of 
highway accidents and fatalities in the United 
States. For example, in 1997 the DOT reported 
444,000 large-truck (greater than 10,000 pounds) 
accidents in the United States, resulting in 5,355 
deaths and 133,000 injuries (Leming, 1998). 
Twenty percent of the reported injuries were 
catastrophic, meaning loss of limbs, brain 
damage, or paralysis requiring long-term 
medical care.
The lack of an adequate number of U.S. truck 
safety inspectors at the border has also been well 
documented. For example, only four full-time 
truck safety inspectors are assigned at the main 
border crossing at Laredo, Texas which processes 
an average of 3,850 Northbound trucks a day 
(TAMIU, 2002). The insurance industry is also 
concerned about the lack of hours-of-service 
limits in Mexico and the incompatibility of 
weight restrictions. In Mexico, trucks are 
allowed to weigh up to 130,000 pounds, 
compared to the United States where the limit is 
only 80,000.
The Teamsters union claims that Mexican trucks 
are unsafe and that Mexican trucking will 
eliminate American jobs are questionable. The 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) published 
a safety study in 1996 which reported that 45% 
of inspected Mexican trucks did not pass safety 
tests while 28% of American trucks failed the 
same tests. In 2000, the GAO reported that the 
number of Mexican trucks that failed safety 
inspections had fallen to 36%, compared to 24% 
of American trucks (GAO, 2000). The 2000 
report suggested that the percentage of Mexican 
trucks failing the safety inspections might be 
linked to the twenty-mile limit placed on 
Mexican trucks entering the United States. 
According to a study by Ross (2000) Mexican 
firms do not use their best trucks for short trips 
across the American border into the commercial 
zone. Rather, the best Mexican trucks are 
reserved for long haul trips, which prevents
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them from being used in cross-border trade. 
This would tend to indicate that the overall 
safety record for all Mexican trucks might be 
better than that reported by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation. This discrepancy 
is supported by a U.S. DOT study which reported 
that, of 500 Mexican trucks caught making 
illegal long haul trips into the United States in 
1999, fewer than 30% failed rigorous safety tests 
(Mongelluzzo, 2000).
The Teamsters Union’s claim that American jobs 
will be threatened is also questionable. Mexico 
has about 375,000 registered commercial trucks 
and 15 large motor freight carriers as compared 
to approximately 7,000,000 commercial trucks 
and over 400 large carriers in the United States 
(Mongelluzzo, 2001). While it is possible that 
Mexican trucks could secure some truckloads of 
merchandise in Mexico for delivery into the 
United States, Mexican carriers would need a 
sales and marketing presence in the United 
States to secure backhaul loads. Without 
backhauls, Mexican trucks would be driving 
many empty, unprofitable miles. It is highly 
unlikely that only a small number of Mexican 
motor carriers with modern vehicles and well- 
trained drivers would be able to successfully 
compete with American trucking industry inside 
the United States.
Progress Toward Open Borders
Since 1987, the United States government has 
invested approximately $370 million for capital 
improvements to help facilitate cross border 
truck movements. The vast majority of this 
federal money has gone to the border states of 
California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas to 
build new ports of entry and improve/expand 
existing ports of entry. New truck inspection 
facilities have been built with this money and 
highways near the border have been widened 
(GAO, 2000). In addition new customs 
procedures have been developed and 
implemented.
The U. S. Customs Service is now using a system 
called the Automated Targeting System at five
border locations. The purpose of this new 
computer-based technology is to expedite the 
flow of Mexican imports by identifying “problem” 
shipments before they arrive at the port of entry. 
Non-problem shipments are then processed 
faster by U.S. Customs. This new system is 
linked to another U.S. Customs innovation called 
the Border Release Advance Screening and 
Selectivity Program. This program is designed 
to speed up imports made by companies who 
regularly import through a given port of entry 
more than fifty times a year using the same 
truck and the same driver. The GAO (2002) 
estimates this program applies to ten percent of 
the truck traffic entering the U.S. from Mexico. 
While these improvements have provided better 
border inspection facilities and in some cases, 
better customs procedures, inadequate border 
staffing by federal agencies including the U.S. 
Customs Service, DEA, USDA, and the 
Immigration Service continues to be a limiting 
factor for cross-border transportation. The lack 
of adequate manpower at the U.S.-Mexican 
border has been exacerbated by the requirement 
to shore up law enforcement and security forces 
along the U.S.-Canadian border following the 
9/11 terrorist attacks. While homeland security 
has become the most important border issue 
facing the Bush Administration, President Bush 
appears committed to complying in full with the 
NAFTA trucking provisions.
The Bush Administration appears to be much 
more inclined to push for an opening of the U.S. 
to Mexican trucking. President Bush has made 
it very clear that he supports the 
implementation of the NAFTA provisions despite 
opposing views from the Democratic Party in 
Congress. In August of 2001, the Senate voted to 
impose stringent safety requirements on 
Mexican trucks that travel on American 
highways (Samuel, 2001). These requirements 
include mandatory inspections at the United 
States border and insurance provided by an U.S. 
licensed insurer. The Bush administration has 
pointed out that Canadian trucks are not forced 
to meet these standards, which has led to claims 
of discrimination from the Republican Party. 
Former Republican Senate Minority leader,
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Trent Lott, has called this bill “anti-Hispanic.” 
President Bush has promised to veto the pending 
transportation bill if these standards are 
required of Mexican trucks. However, this issue 
has become moot in view of recent developments.
On November 27, 2002, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) announced that the Bush 
administration would begin allowing Mexican- 
domiciled trucking companies to apply to the 
DOT for operating authority from Mexico into 
the United States (Gamboa, 2002). In so doing, 
President Bush modified the 1982 congressional 
moratorium on Mexican trucking in the U.S. and 
fulfilled U.S. obligations under NAFTA. 
However, before any Mexican trucking company 
can begin cross-border freight service, its service 
proposal must be approved by the DOT’s new 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA).
Secretary Mineta has said the FMCSA now has 
adequate border inspection facilities and trained 
personnel in place to insure Mexican trucks and 
drivers entering the United States comply with 
the same safety standards U.S.-domiciled 
trucking companies are held to (Longo, 2002). 
These standards include drug and alcohol 
testing, a limit on operating hours without rest 
and logbooks. In addition, Mexican drivers who 
operate in the U.S. must possess a Licencia 
Federal, the equivalent of the U.S.’s Commercial 
Driver’s License (CDL). Mexican trucking 
companies granted operating authority under 
this new process will be allowed to deliver goods 
originating in Mexico to any destination in the 
United States and will be allowed to back-haul 
freight to Mexico. Under the terms of NAFTA, 
Mexico is obligated to extend the same 
opportunities to U.S.-domiciled trucking 
companies.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The improvements that have occurred in 
Mexico’s rail freight system and the recent 
decision of President Bush to open the U.S. to 
Mexican motor freight transport have 
implications for many sectors of both the U.S.
and Mexican economies. As of November 27, 
2002, 130 Mexican-domiciled motor carriers had 
applied to operate beyond the border commercial 
zones in the United States (Longo, 2002). The 
DOT estimates that about 60 of these motor 
carriers have meet the basic requirements and 
are ready for a FMCSA safety audit (Longo).
Based on these numbers it would appear the 
initial impact of Mexican trucking on shippers 
and competing U.S. motor carriers will be 
minimal. Most Mexican motor carriers are small 
and lack the capacity of the average U.S. 
international trucking company. Since most 
U.S. truckload carriers are larger and more 
experienced in competitive markets, they will 
likely benefit more than their smaller, less 
experienced Mexican counterparts. Truckload 
shippers in the United States will have more 
service choices in moving their freight to Mexico 
which may result in lower rates. It is unclear at 
this point what rates Mexican motor carriers will 
offer on backhauls but with lower operating 
costs, it is safe to assume selected rates will be 
lower than current rates being offered by U.S. 
motor carriers. U.S. motor carriers like 
Schnieder and Contract Freighters, Inc. (CFI) 
who have significant trucking operations to and 
from the Mexican border will be most affected. 
While most of the attention over NAFTA and 
cross-border transportation has focused on motor 
freight, the recent improvements in Mexico’s rail 
industry have much broader implications for the 
long term.
Rail freight transportation offers the lowest cost 
alternative for many Mexican and international 
companies who ship large quantities of finished 
goods from Mexican assembly plants 
(Maquiladoras) to U.S. and Canadian 
destinations on a regular basis. Large volume 
shipments of heavy manufactured goods like 
automobiles and durable household goods are 
best suited for rail transport. In the past, the 
Mexican National Railroad was not an effective 
mode for either domestic shipments or cross- 
border shipments. Over the last ten years 
privatization of Mexico’s railroads has brought 
about many service improvements. In addition,
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several large U.S. and Canadian railroad 
companies are now major partners with Mexican 
rail interests. As intermodal improvements are 
implemented, the number of carloadings and 
containers moving by rail between the U.S. and 
Mexico will continue to increase at a rapid pace. 
In fact, under a new U.S. initiative stimulated by 
NAFTA called the “Borders and Corridors” 
program, the U.S. has authorized over $140 
million a year in grants to facilitate efficient 
cross-border rail freight movement (Hamberger, 
2001). With federal encouragement, it is likely 
modern freight trains will travel from Mexican 
cities to U.S. cities as easily as international rail 
service between the U.S. and Canada. This, of 
course, will benefit North American shippers and 
lower the cost of imported goods for many North 
American consumers. It is likely international 
rail service will provide stiff competition for 
motor carriers on selected high-density routes 
over 500 miles much like the case now in the 
United States.
CONCLUSION
The railroad industry in Mexico has made great 
progress over the past eight years. Beginning in 
1994, operating rights for the state-owned 
National Railway were auctioned to private 
companies. The dilapidated state railroad was 
divided into three main sections: the Northeast 
Railroad, Mexican Railways, and the Southeast 
Railroad. The remainder of the railroad was 
divided into five small sections, the rights to 
which were also auctioned to the public. Private 
companies have invested hundreds of millions of 
dollars on rolling stock, infrastructure, security,
and locomotives. Efficiency has been improved 
by reducing the labor force, eliminating 
cabooses, building needed customs clearing yards 
close to the border, and by streamlining 
operations. Mexico has improved its railroads to 
the extent that they are now competitive with 
the nation’s trucking industry, which until 
recently carried ninety percent of the country’s 
freight.
Although the railroads have made dramatic 
improvements, trucking remains the most 
dominant mode of freight transportation in 
Mexico. The trucking industry in Mexico has 
improved to the point where the Bush 
Administration has agreed to allow Mexican- 
domiciled motor carriers to apply for operating 
authority into the United States on a regular 
scheduled basis. The Department of 
Transportation, beginning in the Clinton 
Administration, refused to allow Mexican trucks 
to penetrate beyond fifty miles into the country 
despite the provisions of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, which specifically stated 
that Mexican trucks could deliver to any point in 
the United States beginning in 1996. The U.S. 
Department of Transportation has said it is now 
ready to process the applications and perform 
the safety audits necessary to insure safety 
requirements are met. Many economists believe 
that the operation of Mexican trucks in the 
United States will pose no threat to American 
jobs. It is more likely that U.S. domiciled motor 
carriers will be able to expand their inter­
national routes and manpower and take 
advantage of reciprocal operating rights to and 
from internal Mexican markets.
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